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We associate an optimistic coalitional game with each minimum
cost spanning tree problem. We deﬁne the worth of a coalition as the
cost of connection assuming that the rest of the agents are already
connected. We deﬁne a cost sharing rule as the Shapley value of
this optimistic game. We prove that this rule coincides with a rule
present in the literature under diﬀerent names. We also introduce a
new characterization using a property of equal contributions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study minimum cost spanning tree problems (mcstp).C o n -
sider that a group of agents, located at diﬀerent geographical places, want
some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier.
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1Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. However,
they do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly.
There are many economic situations that can be modeled in this way.
For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant,
and hence have to share the cost of the distribution network. This example
appears in Dutta and Kar (2004). Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) studied
a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes
from their respective houses to a water supplier. Other examples include
communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, or cable television.
The literature on mcstp starts by deﬁning algorithms for constructing
minimal cost spanning trees (mt). We can mention, for instance, the papers
of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957).
Another important issue is how to allocate the cost associated with the mt
between the agents. Bird (1976) and Dutta and Kar (2004) introduced two
rules based on Prim’s algorithm. Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) introduced
the Equal Remaining Obligation rule (ERO) based on Kruskal’s algorithm.
Bird (1976) associated with each mcstp a coalitional game with transfer-
able utility (TU game). According to Bird, the worth of a coalition is the
cost of connection, assuming that the rest of the agents are not present. Since
the Shapley value is a suitable solution concept for TU games, we can use
it in mcstp. Kar (2002) gave additional arguments supporting the Shapley
value of this TU game as a nice rule in mcstp. The core and the nucleolus
of this TU game are studied in Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984).
In this paper, we associate with each mcstp ad i ﬀerent TU game. We
deﬁne the worth of a coalition as the cost of connection, assuming that the
rest of the agents are already connected, and that connection is possible
through them.
Both TU games compute the cost of connecting agents to the source.
The former takes a pessimistic point of view because it assumes, given a
coalition, that the rest of the agents are not connected. The latter takes an
optimistic point of view because it assumes that the rest of the agents are
already connected.
In general there is no relationship between the optimistic and the pes-
simistic TU game. However, it is possible to ﬁnd a relationship in an in-
teresting class of problems. A mcstp is irreducible if reducing the cost of
any arc, the total cost of connection is also reduced. Given a mcstp,B i r d
(1976) deﬁned the irreducible problem associated with it. In Bergantiños
and Vidal-Puga (2005a) we deﬁned the rule ϕ as the Shapley value of the
2TU game associated with the irreducible problem. In Bergantiños and Vidal-
Puga (2005b) we proved that ϕ coincides with ERO.
In this paper, we prove that, in irreducible problems, both TU games are
dual (two TU games v,w are dual if v(S)+w(N \ S) is constant for all S).
Moreover, we deﬁne two rules in mcstp using the optimistic TU game. The
ﬁrst rule is the Shapley value of the optimistic TU game. The second one is
the Shapley value of the optimistic TU game associated with the irreducible
problem.
We thus have four rules in mcstp based on the Shapley value of an associ-
ated TU game. We prove that, in fact, we have two rules. The Shapley value
of the optimistic TU game coincides with the Shapley value of the optimistic
TU game associated with the irreducible form, and with the Shapley value of
the pessimistic TU game associated with the irreducible form. The classical
Shapley value (as deﬁned by Kar (2002)) diﬀers from these three.
Finally, we present a new characterization of ϕ using a property of equal
contributions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce mcstp.I n
Section 3 we introduce the optimistic TU game and we study the relation-
ship among the four Shapley values. In Section 4 we present the axiomatic
characterization. In Appendix we give the proof of some of the results.
2 The minimum cost spanning tree problem
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems.
Let N = {1,2,...} be the set of all possible agents. Given a ﬁnite set
N ⊂ N,l e tΠN be the set of all permutations over N.G i v e n π ∈ ΠN,l e t
Pre(i,π) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the order
given by π, i.e. Pre(i,π)={j ∈ N : π(j) <π(i)}.G i v e n S ⊂ N,l e tπS
denote the order induced by π among agents in S.
We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set N0 =
N ∪ {0},w h e r eN ⊂ N is ﬁnite and 0 is a special node called the source.
Usually we take N = {1,...,n}.
A cost matrix C =( cij)i,j∈N0 on N represents the cost of direct link
between any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each i,j ∈ N0
and cii =0for each i ∈ N0.S i n c e cij = cji we will work with undirected
arcs, i.e. (i,j)=( j,i).
3We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as CN.G i v e nC, C0 ∈ CN
we say C ≤ C0 if cij ≤ c0
ij for all i,j ∈ N0.
A minimum cost spanning tree problem,b r i e ﬂyamcstp, is a pair (N0,C)
where N ⊂ N is a ﬁnite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ CN is the
cost matrix.
Given a mcstp (N0,C),w ed e ﬁne the mcstp induced by C in S ⊂ N as
(S0,C).
A network g over N0 is a subset of {(i,j):i,j ∈ N0}. The elements of g
are called arcs.
Given a network g and a pair of nodes i and j,apath from i to j in g
is a sequence of diﬀerent arcs {(ih−1,i h)}
l
h=1 satisfying (ih−1,i h) ∈ g for all
h ∈ {1,2,...,l}, i = i0,a n dj = il.
A tree is a network satisfying that for all i ∈ N there is a unique path
from i to the source. If t i sat r e ew eu s u a l l yw r i t et = {(i0,i)}i∈N where i0
represents the ﬁr s ta g e n ti nt h eu n i q u ep a t hi nt from i to 0.
Let GN denote the set of all networks over N0.L e tGN
0 denote the set of
all networks where every agent i ∈ N is connected to the source, i.e. there
exists a path from i to 0 in the network.






W h e nt h e r ei sn oa m b i g u i t y ,w ew r i t ec(g) or c(C,g) instead of c(N0,C,g).
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N0,C),b r i e ﬂya nmt,i sat r e et ∈ GN
0
such that c(t)=m i n
g∈GN
0
c(g).I ti sw e l l - k n o w nt h a ta nmt exists, even though
it is not necessarily unique. Given a mcstp (N0,C), we denote the cost
associated with any mt t in (N0,C) as m(N0,C).
Given an mcstp, Prim (1957) introduced an algorithm for solving the
problem of connecting all agents to the source, such that the total cost of
creating the network is minimal. The idea of this algorithm is quite simple:
starting from the source we construct a network by consecutively adding arcs
with the lowest cost and without introducing cycles.
Formally, Prim’s algorithm is deﬁned as follows. We start with S0 = {0}
and g0 = ∅.
Stage 1:T a k ea na r c(0,i) such that c0i =m i n
i∈N
{c0i}. If there are several
arcs (0,i) satisfying this condition, select any of them. Now, S1 = {0,i} and
4g1 = {(0,i)}.
Stage p +1 : Assume that we have deﬁned Sp ⊂ N0 and gp ∈ GN.W e
now deﬁne Sp+1 and gp+1.T a k e a n a r c (j,i) with j ∈ Sp and i ∈ No \ Sp
such that cji =m i n
k∈Sp,l∈No\Sp {ckl}. If there are several arcs (j,i) satisfying this
condition, select any of them. Now, Sp+1 = Sp∪{i} and gp+1 = gp∪{(j,i)}.
This process is completed in n stages. We say that gn is a tree obtained
via Prim’s algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a tree, but that
this is not always unique.
One of the most important issues addressed in the literature about mcstp
is how to divide the cost of connecting agents to the source between them.
We now brieﬂy introduce some of the rules studied in the literature.
A( cost allocation) rule is a function ψ such that ψ(N0,C) ∈ RN for
each mcstp (N0,C) and
P
i∈N
ψi (N0,C)=m(N0,C). As usual, ψi (N0,C)
represents the cost allocated to agent i.
Notice that we implicitly assume that the agents build an mt. As far as
we know, all the rules proposed in the literature make this assumption.
A coalitional game with transferable utility,b r i e ﬂyaTU game,i sap a i r
(N,v) where v :2 N → R satisﬁes that v(∅)=0 . Sh(N,v) denotes the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of (N,v).
A quite standard approach for deﬁn i n gr u l e si ns o m ep r o b l e m si su s i n g
TU games. We ﬁrst associate with each problem a TU game. We then
compute a solution for TU games (Shapley value, core, ...) in the associated
TU g a m e .T h u s ,t h er u l ei nt h eo r i g i n a lp r o b l e mi sd e ﬁned as the solution
applied to the TU game associated with the original problem. This approach
was already applied in mcstp.
Bird (1976) associated a TU game (N,vC) with each mcstp (N0,C).F o r
each coalition S ⊂ N,
vC (S)=m(S0,C).




This rule was studied in Kar (2002).
A mcstp (N0,C) is irreducible i fr e d u c i n gt h ec o s to fa n ya r c ,t h ec o s to f
connecting agents to the source (m(N0,C)) is also reduced. In Bergantiños
and Vidal-Puga (2005a, Proposition 3.1) we prove that (N0,C) is irreducible
5if and only if there exists an mt t in (N0,C) satisfying the two following
conditions:
(A1) t = {(ip−1,i p)}
n
p=1 where i0 =0(the source).






Given a mcstp (N0,C), Bird (1976) deﬁned the irreducible form (N0,C∗)
associated with (N0,C).W ed e ﬁne the rule Sh2 as the Shapley value of the
TU game associated with the irreducible form, i.e.
Sh
2 (N0,C)=Sh(N,vC∗).
In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005b) we proved that ϕ coincides with
the Equal Remaining Obligations rule (Feltkamp et al., 1994).
3 The optimistic approach






with each mcstp (N0,C).
Next we deﬁne two rules based on the Shapley value of the optimistic game.
Sh3 is deﬁned as the Shapley value of the optimistic game associated with
C. Sh4 is the Shapley value of the optimistic game associated with the
irreducible form C∗. The main result of this section says that Sh2,S h 3, and
Sh4 coincide.
Given S ⊂ N, Bird (1976) deﬁned the worth of coalition S, vC (S),a s
the minimal cost of connecting all agents of S to the source, assuming that
agents in N\S are out. This is a pessimistic approach because agents in N\S
want to be connected to the source.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,w ec a nt a k ea no p t i m i s t i ca p p r o a c h . W ec a nd e ﬁne the
worth of coalition S, v
+
C (S), as the minimal cost of connecting all agents of
S to the source, assuming that agents of N \ S are already connected and
agents in S can connect to the source through them.
In many problems it is possible to associate two TU games: a pessimistic
game and an optimistic game. An example could be queuing problems, where
a set of agents stands to receive a service. No two agents can be served
simultaneously. Each agent has a const a n tp e ru n i to ft i m ew a i t i n gc o s t .A
queue has to be organized, but monetary compensations may be set up for
those who have to wait. Maniquet (2003) deﬁned the worth of a coalition S
as the sum of its waiting cost in an eﬃcient queue if they had the power to
6be served before agents in N\S. Maniquet is taking an optimistic approach.
Later, Chun (2004) deﬁned the worth of a coalition S as the sum of its waiting
cost in an eﬃcient queue, assuming that members of S are served after the
members of N\S. Of course, Chun is taking a pessimistic approach.




obtained from (N0,C) assuming that agents in S have to be connected, agents
in T are already connected, and agents in S can connect to the source through
agents in T. Formally, c
+T
ij = cij for all i,j ∈ S and c
+T



















Notice that given S ⊂ N, v
+
C (S) is the minimal cost of connecting all
the agents of S to the source assuming that the agents of N \ S are already
connected.


















This example shows that vC and v
+
C are diﬀerent in general.
We say that two mcstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0) are tree-equivalent if there
exists a tree t such that, ﬁrstly, t is an mt for both (N0,C) and (N0,C0) and
secondly, cij = c0
ij for all (i,j) ∈ t.
In the next theorem we give some results about v
+
C.
Theorem 1. (a) If (N0,C) is irreducible, then
vC (S)+v
+
C (N \ S)=m(N0,C)
7for all S ⊂ N.





Proof.S e eA p p e n d i x .
Theorem 1(a) says that (N,v) and (N,v+) are dual games in irreducible
problems. This result it is not true when (N0,C) is not an irreducible prob-
lem. In Example 1, vC ({2})=1 0 0 , v
+
C ({1})=2 ,a n dm(N0,C)=1 2 .
In Section 2 we deﬁned two rules in mcstp based on the Shapley value of
the pessimistic game: Sh1 (N0,C)=Sh(N,vC) and Sh2 (N0,C)=Sh(N,vC∗).
We now introduce two rules in mcstp based on the Shapley value of the

















If we compute the four rules in Example 1 we obtain





In this example Sh2 (N0,C)=Sh3 (N0,C)=Sh4 (N0,C). We now prove
that this is true in general.





Proof.L e t(N0,C) be a mcstp.
In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005a, Remark 3.1) we proved that C and




C∗.T h u s ,Sh3 (N0,C)=
Sh4 (N0,C).
Under Theorem 1(a), vC∗ (S)+v
+
C∗ (N \ S)=m(N0,C) for all S ⊂ N.
Since vC∗ (N)=v
+
C∗ (N)=m(N0,C∗) and for all i ∈ N the Shapley value of






(v(Pre(i,π) ∪ {i}) − v(Pre(i,π))),
8it is not diﬃcult to conclude that Sh2 (N,C)=Sh4 (N,C). ¥














4 An axiomatic characterization
Myerson (1980) introduced the property of balanced contributions in TU
games. Next property is inspired by Myerson’s property.
We say that a rule ψ satisﬁes Equal Contributions (EC) if for all i,j ∈ N,
i 6= j,
ψi (N0,C) − ψi
¡
(N \{ j})0 ,C
+j¢
= ψj (N0,C) − ψj
¡
(N \{ i})0 ,C
+i¢
.
EC says that the impact of the connection of agent j on agent’s i cost
coincides with the impact of the connection of agent i on agent’s j cost.
Next theorem characterizes ϕ a st h eo n l yr u l es a t i s f y i n gEC.
Theorem 3. ϕ i st h eo n l yr u l es a t i s f y i n gEC.
Proof.W eﬁrst prove that ϕ satisﬁes EC.
For all i ∈ N, we denote N−i = N \{ i} and N
−i
0 = N0 \{ i}.
Given a TU game (N,v), Myerson (1980) proved that the Shapley value
satisﬁes










for all i,j ∈ N, i 6= j.

























, we obtain that ϕ
satisﬁes EC.
We now prove the uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying EC.W ep r o v e
that ψ = ϕ by induction on |N|.I f|N| =1it is trivial. Assume that ψ = ϕ
when |N| ≤ α − 1.W ep r o v et h a tψ = ϕ when |N| = α.


































































j . Thus, ϕi = ψi for all i ∈ N. ¥
Kar (2002) characterized Sh1 a st h eo n l yr u l es a t i s f y i n gEﬃciency, Ab-
sence of Cross Subsidization, Group independence,a n dEqual Treatment.
Ar u l eψ satisﬁes Equal Treatment (ET) if given (N0,C) and (N0,C0)
such that clk = c0
lk for all (l,k) 6=( i,j),
ψi (N0,C) − ψi (N0,C
0)=ψj (N0,C) − ψj (N0,C
0).
ET says that if the cost between agents i and j changes, both agents
must win (or loss) the same.
Under Theorem 3, Sh1 does not satisfy EC. Next example shows that ϕ
does not satisfy ET.

















Making some computations we obtain that ϕ(N0,C)=( 5 ,10) and ϕ(N0,C0)=
(5,12). Nevertheless, Sh1 (N0,C)=( 3 ,12) and Sh1 (N0,C0)=( 4 ,13).
We have two rules for mcstp based on the Shapley value of an associated
coalitional game: Sh1 and ϕ.B o t hr u l e sa r ev e r yd i ﬀerent, as we can see in
the examples. The rule Sh1 is deﬁned through the pessimistic TU game. The
10rule ϕ can be deﬁned through the pessimistic TU game and both optimistic
TU games.
O n em a yw o n d e rw h i c hi st h ef a i r e s tr u l e( Sh1 or ϕ)? We strongly believe
that ϕ is a more suitable rule in mcstp. See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2005a) for a detailed discussion about this issue.
There exist many problems where authors propose rules through opti-
mistic TU games and pessimistic TU games. We conclude the section com-
paring mcstp with bankruptcy problems and queuing problems.
In bankruptcy problems the Shapley value of the pessimistic TU game
and the Shapley value of the optimistic TU game coincide. See, for instance,
Thomson (2003). The reason is that both games are dual, like in irreducible
mcstp.
In queuing problems the Shapley value of both games are diﬀerent, like in
general mcstp. Maniquet (2003) studied the Shapley value of the optimistic
game. He provided several axiomatic characterizations. Chun (2004) stud-
ied the Shapley value of the pessimistic game, which he called the reverse
rule. He provided axiomatic characterizations of the reverse rule. These
characterizations are obtained by changing some properties in Maniquet’s
characterization by their "reverse".
5 Appendix
We prove Theorem 1.
(a) Assume, without loss of generality, that t = {(i − 1,i)}
n
i=1 is the tree





ip−1 ≤ ip for all p =2 ,...,|S|.
For each p =1 ,...,|S| we deﬁne:
S
p = {i ∈ N : ip−1 <i<i p}.




i ∈ N : i|S| <i≤ n
ª
.
Thus, Sp ⊂ N\S for all p =1 ,...,|S|+1,
|S|+1 S
p=1
Sp = N\S, and Sp∩Sq = ∅




C (N \ S)=m
¡




(N \ S)0 ,C
+S,t
0¢
where t0 is obtained following Prim’s algorithm. We now compute t0.




0i =m i n
k∈S0












T h i sm e a n st h a tw ec a nc o n s t r u c tt0 such that there is no direct link between
agents in Sp and Sq.









0 is an mt computed follow-





.W h e nSp = ∅, we take t0
S
p
0 = ∅. Hence,
v
+




















where p<|S|+1. We ﬁrst
select an arc (0,i) such that c
+S







. We have already proved that
c
+S































is (0,i p−1 +1 )(the case where
the arc selected is (ip − 1,0) is similar and we omit it). Notice that the arc





corresponds to the arc (ip−1,i p−1 +1 )in (N0,C).
Using arguments similar to those used before, we can conclude that the
second arc selected is the arc (i,j) such that
c
+S



















N0,C,t Sp∪{ip−1,ip} \{ (ip0 − 1,i p0)}
¢
12where (ip0 − 1,i p0) satisﬁes that
c(ip0−1)ip0 =m a x
j=ip−1+1,...,ip
c(j−1)j.


































































Since t is an mt in (N0,C),
n P
j=1
c(j−1)j = m(N0,C). In Bergantiños and
Vidal-Puga (2005a, Proposition 3.3(a))w ep r o v e dt h a t
|S| P
p=1
cip−1ip = vC (S).
Thus (a) holds.
(b) Let (N0,C) and (N0,C0) be two tree-equivalent problems. Assume
that t = {(i0,i)}
n
i=1 is an mt in (N0,C) and (N0,C0) satisfying that ci0i = c0
i0i
for all i =1 ,...,n.F o ra l li ∈ N, i0 ∈ N0 is the ﬁrst node in the unique path
from i to the source.
We proceed by induction on |N|.I f|N| =1the result is trivial. Assume
that the result holds when |N| ≤ α − 1. We now prove it when |N| = α.
In order to simplify the notation, for all i ∈ N we denote N−i = N \{i}.
13We prove several claims.












Let i,k ∈ S such that i 6=0and k 6=0 .T h u s ,
c
+(N\S)






Given i ∈ S,
c
+(N\S)



































Claim 2. Assume that t∗ is an mt in (N0,C) and j ∈ N.L e t g =
{(ip−1,i p)}
r
p=1 be the unique path in t∗ from 0( =i0) to j (= ir).L e tq such





.G i v e nA∗






































































14Let Sj denote the set of agents in N−j “connected to the source in t0





















We can ﬁnd (it−1,i t) ∈ g ⊂ t∗ such that it−1 ∈ N
−j






























































which is a contradiction because t∗ is an mt of (N0,C).
















obtained from the mt t
in (N0,C) as in the statement of Claim 2. Similarly, let t0




obtained from the mt t in (N0,C0) as in the statement of Claim
2.
It is not diﬃcult to see that tj = t0















C coincides with v
+
C0.
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